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PROGRESA’S CASH TRANSFERS IN MEXICO 
 
David P. Coady   ii 
ABSTRACT 
Using both national-sample and program-level census survey data, we evaluate 
the distributional power of Mexico￿s Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud y 
Alimentacion (PROGRESA) transfers using the so-called distributional characteristic. 
These transfers are targeted both geographically at marginal localities and at poor 
households within these localities. Transfers are also conditioned on household members 
attending school and health clinics. We show that the program has a relatively high 
distributional power compared to a range of alternatives considered. Although geographic 
targeting has a relatively large effect on the distributional power of the program, the 
demographic structure of transfers is more important than household targeting. However, 
the gains from household targeting increase as the program expands into less marginal 
localities. Within the structure of transfers, the education component is distributionally 
more powerful than the food component, reflecting the fact that the former is based on 
household demographics, while the latter is uniform across households. Restructuring 
education grants towards secondary schooling in order to generate higher education 
impacts does not appear to affect the distributional power of the program. In any case, 
any adverse impact could be offset by increasing the cap on transfers, which is regressive. 
Take-up of the program is high but relatively higher among the poorest households, thus 
increasing distributional power. However, this effect is mitigated by the fact that, 
conditional on program take-up, the poorest households take up a relatively lower 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the emphasis on cutting budget deficits inherent in the structural 
adjustment programs of the mid 1980s onwards, there has been much debate, both in 
academic and policy circles, regarding the desirability of targeting transfer programs. On 
the one hand, well-targeted transfers can achieve a greater reduction in poverty for a 
fixed budget. On the other, targeting involves costs related to the collection, processing 
and analysis of survey data, and also involves excluding poor households solely on the 
basis of geographic location.
1 Motivated by this debate, in August 1997, the Mexican 
government introduced the Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion 
(PROGRESA) with dual objectives, namely (1) the alleviation of current poverty through 
targeted cash transfers, and (2) the generation of a sustained decrease in poverty by 
conditioning these transfers on the accumulation of human capital (i.e., education and 
health status). In a sense, targeting is meant to increase the effectiveness of the program 
at ensuring that a large fraction of the budget gets to the poorest households (i.e., to 
increase the distributional power of the program), while conditioning is meant to 
introduce incentives for beneficial household responses. Since the introduction of 
PROGRESA, many others countries in Latin America have introduced similar programs.
2 
                                                 
1 The exclusion of poor households based on geographic location is seen as undesirable from the 
perspective of horizontal equity, which requires equal treatment of equals based on ￿relevant￿ 
characteristics. It is therefore desirable that other components of a more comprehensive poverty alleviation 
strategy address this issue. Note that targeting may also involve non-economic costs (see Adato 2000). 
2  Similar programs have already been introduced in Honduras and Nicaragua, while Argentina, Brazil, and 
Colombia are currently at the design stage.   2 
In this paper we are interested in evaluating the program from the perspective of 
the first of the stated objectives, i.e., we wish to evaluate the distributional power of the 
program as reflected in its ability to get a relatively large proportion of the budget to the 
poorest households. As pointed out above, the targeted dimension of the program is 
obviously motivated by such an objective. The program is targeted in two respects. First, 
it is targeted to the poorest (or most marginal) rural localities, i.e., it is geographically 
targeted. Second, it is targeted at ￿poor￿ households within these localities. The 
conditioning of transfers in order to achieve the human capital objectives may also have 
important implications for its (short-term) distributional power. First, the linking of 
transfer levels to the demographic structure of households (i.e., transfers to children of 
school-going age) will, in general, affect its distributional power. Second, the 
conditioning of transfers to the accumulation of human capital involves households 
incurring private costs (e.g., those associated with schooling and health visits), which will 
generally affect the pattern of program take-up and thus its distributional power. 
The objectives of this paper are threefold. We wish to (1) determine how the 
existing structure of the transfers compares to a range of alternatives, (2) understand how 
the different components of the transfer system contribute to or detract from the 
distributional power of the program, and (3) understand any trade-offs that exist between 
the poverty alleviation and human capital accumulation objectives of the program. 
The format of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set out the 
methodology used in the paper. In Section 3, we describe the program. Section 4 
addresses the issue of the relative gains from geographic and household targeting. Section   3 
5 presents an analysis of the distributional power of the program, conditional on locality 
targeting. Section 6 summarizes. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we motivate and discuss the methodology employed to evaluate 
the distributional power of the program. For this purpose, it is useful to set out a very 
simple model of an economy with two groups, namely, households and the government.
3 
The objective of public policy is taken to be to increase social welfare, which, in turn, 
depends on household welfare. For our purposes, the objective of the ￿social planner￿ 
may then be specified as choosing the size of the transfer to or from each household so as 
to maximize social welfare subject to the government budget constraint that the sum of 
transfers to household is less than or equal to the sum of transfers from households plus 
some exogenous budget, F (e.g., a predetermined level of foreign aid). Specifically, 
social welfare is specified as a function of household welfare, V(p,m), where p is the 
vector of commodity and factor prices faced by the household and m is lump-sum 
transfers to or from the government. The Lagrangean function for the planner￿s problem 
can thus be written as choosing a set of values m
h for each household h so as to:  
 
∑ − + = Ψ
h
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3 This section draws directly on Coady and Skoufias (2001) and Skoufias and Coady (2001). See DrŁze and 
Stern (1987) and Coady and DrŁze (2001) for a more rigorous discussion of the model.   4 
where W(.) is the social welfare function and λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
the budget constraint.
4 This specification is essentially the specification for the 
determination of the optimal levels of cash transfers that maximize social welfare. As is 
well known (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; Stiglitz 1988), the solution to this optimization 
problem is determined from the first-order necessary conditions: 
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which implies  λ β =
h *, for all h, where β
h is the social valuation of an extra unit of 
income to household h, the so-called ￿welfare weight￿ of household h, and λ
* is the 
marginal social value of government revenue at the optimum. In other words, at the 
optimum, the pattern of transfers must be such that the social valuation of income at the 
margin is constant across all households. If all households are modeled as having the 
same utility function, then the optimum is characterized by an equal distribution of 
income. 
By summing across all households and rearranging, the above first-order 
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4  This formulation of the problem essentially assumes that cash transfers are nondistortionary lump-sum 
transfers and that no other distortions exist in the economy. Although restrictive, this simple formulation is 
adequate for our purposes. See DrŁze and Stern (1987) for details and Coady and Harris (2000) for an 
application where tax distortions already exist and must be manipulated to finance the program.   5 
One can interpret alternative income vectors dm = {￿, dm
h ,￿} as representing 
alternative targeting schemes for a given budget. This statistic is simply the benefit 
derived from the transfers divided by the program budget, i.e., the social welfare impact 
per unit of funds transferred or the benefit-cost ratio of a transfer program.
5 At the 
optimum this is constant across all programs. Optimality essentially assumes that the 
poverty-alleviation budget is endogenously determined. In practice, however, there are 
economic, social, and political constraints both on the size of budgets and their 
distribution. In the absence of an optimal distribution of income, β
h will, in general, differ 
across households. Therefore, λ  will differ across alternative transfer programs both 
because β
h differs across households and the structure of dm differs across alternative 
programs.  
 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
Based on the above, for each program j, we have an associated distributional 
characteristic defined as 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is analogous to the so-called distributional characteristic found in the literature on indirect taxation. For 
a more detailed discussion of this literature see, for examples, Feldstein (1972), Sandmo (1976), Auerbach 
(1985), Newbery and Stern (1987), and Myles (1995). 













λ  6 
which can be interpreted as the marginal social value of a unit of revenue transferred to 
households through the program in question. It can be used to compare the relative 
welfare impact of alternative programs with a common budget or of reallocations of a 
budget between different programs. Notice that it is independent of the size of the budget, 
i.e., scaling up or down benefits and the budget of a program proportionally will not 
change its distributional characteristic. 
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where θ j
h is the share of household h in the total budget of program j. Programs in which 
those receiving relatively high shares of the budget have relatively high welfare weights 
(i.e., are relatively needy) will obviously have relatively high welfare impacts. In this 
sense, it captures the distributional power of a program, i.e., how effective a given 
program is at getting the transfer budget to the most needy households. 
 
ALLOWING FOR DIFFERENT PROGRAM BUDGETS 
As pointed out above, the distributional characteristic of a program is scale 
neutral in that it is independent of the size of the budget (or level of transfers) and 
depends only on the distribution of transfers across households. Therefore, it serves as a 
sufficient statistic only for evaluations comparing alternative distributions of a fixed   7 
budget or for the reallocation of funds across budgets. When program budgets (B) differ, 
then it is also useful to think of the welfare impact as 







* ,  (4) 
 
 
where an asterisk denotes a proportional change. In other words, the proportional 
difference in the impact between two programs can be seen as the sum of the proportional 
difference in the welfare impact per unit of budget expenditure (i.e., the distributional 
characteristic) plus the proportionate difference in the total budget. For well-targeted 
programs, one expects λ
* to be negative in the face of program expansion to include more 
households (i.e., extensive expansion due, for example, to an increase in the poverty line 
being used to select households). For intensive expansion, i.e., an increase in the transfer 
levels to existing beneficiaries, λ
* = 0, so that W
* = B
*.
6 In other words, the proportional 
difference in program budgets can be taken as the proportional difference in their welfare 
impacts only for an intensive expansion of the program. 
 
COMPARISON ACROSS PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
Where a program consists of a combination of separately identifiable transfer 
components (e.g., education subsidies and food transfers for the present program), it is 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking this is only true for marginal increases in transfer levels since otherwise welfare weights 
are endogenous and decreasing in transfer levels.   8 
useful to decompose the distributional characteristic by component. By viewing dm as the 
sum of a number of components, i, it is easy to show that 
  ∑ =
i i iσ λ λ  ,  (5) 
 
where λ  is the distributional characteristic for the full program, λ i is the distribution 
characteristic for component i in isolation, and σ i is the share of component i in the total 
program budget. By comparing across λ i, one can determine the relative distributional 
power of the various components. 
 
TARGETING EFFICIENCY VERSUS REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFICIENCY 
It is also often useful to decompose the λ  for each program into the sum of its 
targeting efficiency (λ T) and its redistributive efficiency (λ R) by adding and subtracting 
the average level of the transfer across all beneficiaries (i.e., across households with 
dm
h > 0) to get (Coady and Skoufias 2001) 
 























 ,  (6) 
 
where, for beneficiaries, dm
* > 0 is the average level of the transfer across beneficiaries 
while, for nonbeneficiaries, dm
* = 0. One can interpret λ T as the welfare impact of a 
program that transfers the poverty alleviation budget to the same beneficiary households 
but in equal amounts, and λ R as the adjustment that needs to be made to allow for the   9 
differentiation of the transfers across households in a more progressive (λ R > 0) or 
regressive (λ R < 0) manner.
7 
 
WELFARE GAINS FROM HOUSEHOLD TARGETING 
One of the contentious issues related to the program has been the decision to 
target households within localities. Evaluating the gains from targeting within the present 
framework is straightforward; one just treats the targeted (T) and nontargeted (N) 
programs as separate programs with different patterns of transfers across households. But 
one may also be interested in evaluating how the gains from targeting are distributed 











h h h h h
dm
dm dm dm ) .......... ( 2 1 β β β
λ  ,  (7) 
 
where dmi = dm for households living in locality i and equals zero otherwise, with L 
localities. Multiplying and dividing through by ∑hdmi
h, this can be rewritten as 
 
  i i iθ λ λ ∑ =  ,  (8) 
 
where subscript i refers to localities. Therefore, the distributional characteristic of a 
program can be seen as a weighted average of the distributional characteristics of 
                                                 
7 This decomposition essentially views a uniform transfer as distributionally ￿neutral.￿ A similar 
decomposition can be derived by replacing the uniform transfer with a proportional transfer. The former 
has been termed rightist by Kolm (1976), and the latter is often termed leftist, since it is a more demanding 
definition of neutrality. Intermediate versions, termed µ -variance are discussed in Eichhorn (1988).   10 
subprograms in each locality, with the share of the total budget going to each locality (θ i) 
as weights. One can then write the welfare gains due to targeting as 
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where superscripts T and N refer to the targeted and nontargeted programs and g refers to 
the gain from targeting.
8 So the total welfare gains from targeting can be seen as a 
weighted average of the welfare gains from targeting across localities with locality 
budget shares as weights. 
 
INTRODUCING PROGRAM COSTS 
So far, we have ignored the fact that different programs may involve different 
levels of administrative costs. For example, targeting will generally require the collection, 
processing, and analysis of extra survey information. Higher administrative costs mean 
that a smaller proportion of the poverty alleviation budget is available to be transferred to 
households. If administrative costs increase with the degree of targeting, then there will 
be a trade-off between the increased distributional power due to finer targeting (or the 
marginal benefit from finer targeting, MB) and the decreased budget available for 
transfers (or the marginal cost of finer targeting, MC). The magnitude of this trade-off, or 
where MB = MC, is an empirical issue. 
                                                 
8 In deriving this, we make use of the assumption that locality budget shares are kept constant so that the 
nontargeted transfers can be viewed as being scaled down appropriately.   11 
The adjustment needed to be made to equation (1) for the presence of program 
costs is straightforward. The equation for the distributional characteristic becomes 
 
 




where C is total program costs.
9 Finer targeting essentially involves (1) increasing the 
numerator through increasing the correlation between welfare weights and transfer levels, 
and (2) increasing the denominator by increasing C. We make use of this definition of the 
distributional characteristic below when we compare targeted versus nontargeted 
programs or when comparing programs with different degrees of targeting (e.g., 
geographic versus geographic plus household). 
 
WELFARE WEIGHTS 
Underlying our objective of poverty alleviation must be the view that extra 
income to low-income (or poor) households is more socially valuable than extra income 
to high-income (or nonpoor) households. Making this view explicit essentially requires 
the specification of a set of ￿welfare weights￿ and we expect this weight to decrease with 
the (initial) consumption (or welfare) level of the household. The welfare weight for each 
household (β
h) can be derived from a constant elasticity social welfare function as 
follows (Atkinson 1970): 
                                                 
9 If C is interpreted as (incremental) private costs that can be attributed differently to specific groups of 
households, then one could instead include the term (dm
h - c
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where y refers to consumption (or ￿permanent income￿), h superscript denotes the 
household in question, and k superscript denotes a reference household, which always has 
a weight of unity (e.g., the household just on the poverty line, in which case y
k = z, where 
z is the poverty line).
10 The term e captures one￿s ￿aversion to inequality￿ of income or 
consumption and determines how the welfare weights vary (i.e., decrease) with 
household income. For example, a value of e = 0 implies no aversion to inequality and all 
welfare weights take the value unity, i.e., an extra unit of income to households is viewed 
as being equally socially valuable regardless of initial consumption levels. A value of 
e = 1 implies that if household h has twice (half) the income of household k, then its 
welfare weight is 0.5 (2.0) as opposed to unity for k. A value of e = 2 similarly implies a 
welfare weight of 0.25 (4.0) for h. As e approaches infinity, the impact of the program on 
the welfare of the lowest-income group dominates any evaluation, consistent with a 
Rawlsian maxi-min social welfare perspective in which one cares only about how much 
of the program benefits are received by the poorest of the poor. The welfare weights used 
in our simulations presented below use initial consumption as their welfare reference and 
we also evaluate the sensitivity of our findings to different sets of welfare weights based 
on different degrees of aversion to inequality of initial consumption (i.e., different values 
of e). Consistent with the program objectives, we consider only values of e > 0. 
                                                 
10 Which household we use as the reference household to normalize welfare weights is irrelevant to our 
analysis. See, for example, Ahmad and Stern (1984; 1991, 129) for discussion on the choice of welfare 
weights.   13 
3. A DESCRIPTION OF PROGRESA 
The targeting process adopted by PROGRESA is essentially a two-stage 
process.
11 Using the national census data, an index of marginality (IML) is constructed 
for each locality. Based on this index, the most marginal localities are chosen to 
participate in the program. Once participating localities are identified, PROGRESA then 
undertook a locality census (Encuesta de Caracter￿sticas Socioecon￿micas de los Hogares 
[ENCASEH]) that includes data on household demographics, income, and assets. 
Households are categorized as ￿poor￿ and ￿nonpoor￿ based on income with reference to a 
standard food basket. Households are then reclassified using discriminant analysis and 
household characteristics other than income, e.g., dependency ratio, characteristics of 
household head (i.e., age, sex, occupation, and schooling), and dwelling characteristics. 
This classification process appears to have changed over time: the initial classification 
(PRO) had just over 50 percent of households classified as poor, but this increased to 
nearly 80 percent with the ￿densification￿ process (PROD), which used a higher poverty 
line. The increase in the percentage of households classified as poor came about 
essentially due to a community participation process that suggested that the program 
selection mechanism had led to a substantial underestimate of the poverty rate. 
Once households are deemed eligible for the program, they receive benefits 
according to the structure set out in Table 1. There are two types of benefits. First, there 
is the education subsidy, which starts in grade 3 in primary school continuing until grade 
                                                 
11 See Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999) for details.   14 
9 at the end of junior secondary school. To receive the subsidy, children must attend 
school at least 85 percent of the time. Subsidies increase with age and are also higher for 
girls in secondary school.
12 Second, households receive a fixed transfer made conditional 
on household members making trips to health clinics for preventative check-ups. 
Transfers are given to mothers every two months and, in principle, eligibility is to be 
reviewed every three years. By applying the grants structure set out in Table 1 to the data,  
 
Table 1—Benefit structure of PROGRESA, 1997 (pesos/month) 
 Boys  Girls 
Education Scholarships     
 Primary     
    8 years old   60   60 
    9 years old   70   70 
    10 years old   90   90 
  11-12  years  old  120  120 
  Materials  (annual)  110  110 
 Secondary     
  13-14  years  old  175  185 
  15  years  old  185  205 
  16-17  years  old  195  225 
  Materials  (annual)  140  140 
Food Transfer     90 per family 
Benefit Cap    550 per family 
Note:   The benefits structure is meant to mimic as closely as possible that of the actual program that is 
linked to grades and not age: we choose age since this is consistent with an unconditional 
transfer program and, in any case, the data on maximum grade achieved is not very reliable. To 
be consistent with the figures for monthly per adult equivalent consumption, these numbers are 
deflated by a factor of 2.2868 to bring them to 1994 prices. The structure of scholarships is 
applied by age group but, in practice, is applied by grade and conditional on enrollment and 
attendance. All families receive the food transfer but, in practice, this is made conditional on 
regular visits to a health clinic. The cap on the total benefits a household can receive is applied 
only to the sum of the education scholarships and food transfer. 
 
                                                 
12 In reality, subsidies are linked to grade, not age. Typically the ages of children over the grades 3-9 range 
from 8-17 years old, although there is also evidence of slower progression over the early years, particularly 
for boys. Throughout our analysis, we link subsidies to age as indicated in the table, partly because the 
information on maximum grade achieved is not very clean.   15 
we are essentially assuming 100 percent take-up of benefits, which is probably more 
likely to reflect the situation if the transfers were unconditional. We use this structure of 
transfers as our reference, but we also compare these hypothetical transfers to actual 
transfers. 
By the end of 1999, the program was being implemented in nearly 50,000 rural 
localities in over 2,000 municipalities in 31 states. In all, approximately 2.6 million 
families, equivalent to 40 percent of all rural families and one-ninth of all families, were 
receiving benefits. The total budget of the program was just under 20 percent of the 
federal poverty alleviation budget or 0.2 percent of GDP. 
The analysis below is split into two parts. First, using household survey data, we 
analyze the relative welfare gains from geographic and household-level targeting. 
Second, conditional on geographic targeting, we use program data to further analyze the 
welfare gains from household-level targeting as well as the implications of the 
demographic structure of transfers and of take-up for the distributional power of the 
program. 
 
4. COMPARING GEOGRAPHIC AND HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL TARGETING 
As indicated above, the program targets in two dimensions. It first targets the 
most marginal localities (i.e., geographic targeting) and then targets poor households 
within these localities (i.e., household targeting). While such targeting is obviously 
expected to increase the distributional power of transfers, one also needs to recognize that   16 
targeting requires resources. In this section, we use nationally representative household 
survey data to simulate the potential welfare gains from locality and household targeting. 
We base our simulations on the 1996 Mexican National Survey of Income and 
Expenditures (ENIGH), which contains 13,649 households in 33 states, 416 
municipalities, and 708 localities.
13 The welfare index we use is consumption per adult 
equivalent (CPAE). For the purposes of simulation, we assume that the bottom 30 percent 
of households according to CPAE are ￿poor￿ and the structure of transfers is based on 
that presented in Table 1. We evaluate three programs: 
 
1.  universal eligibility, where all households receive benefits (i.e., no targeting),  
2.  locality targeting, where all households in the poorest localities receive transfers 
(i.e., first-stage targeting), and 
3.  household targeting, where only poor households in the poorest localities receive 
transfers (i.e., first- and second-stage targeting). 
 
The program budget is determined by (3), which differs from (2) in that more localities 
can be included when nonpoor households are excluded. Note that (3) can be viewed as 
￿perfect targeting￿ since all poor households are correctly identified and included. 
In Figure 1, we compare the percentage increase in the distributional 
characteristic in moving from (1) to (2) and (3), i.e., from introducing finer levels of 
                                                 
13 In our analysis we ignore the fact that the survey is only representative at the state and urban-rural level. 
This may have important implications for the standard errors around our estimates.   17 
targeting. Since we are assuming perfect knowledge of household or mean locality 
welfare, welfare gains should be viewed as upper bounds. As one expects, the gains from 
targeting increase the greater one￿s concern for the poorest of the poor. For moderate 
aversion to inequality (e.g., e = 2), the gains from locality targeting are 67 percent 
compared to 85 percent for household targeting. Therefore, the gains from the first-stage 
locality targeting account for between 76-88 percent of the gains from household 
targeting, this increasing with inequality aversion. Therefore, the gains from second-stage 
household targeting appear relatively small, even without any targeting errors. 
The above results ignore the costs of targeting. In Coady, Perez, and Vera-Llamas 
(2000), we calculate that first-stage locality targeting costs 0.004 pesos for every 100 
pesos transferred to households, while second-stage household targeting costs an extra 
2.7 pesos per 100 pesos transferred. The relatively low cost of first-stage targeting 
reflects the fact that it was based on an existing census and therefore simply involved 
processing and analyzing these data.
14 These fixed costs are also spread over a large 
number of households receiving relatively large transfers. Household-level targeting 
requires the collection, processing, and analysis of new household survey data (i.e., the 
ENCASEH data used below). Even then, the associated costs are not exorbitant, 
reflecting a combination of management efficiency and relatively high transfers. When 
these costs are included, they result in a scaling down of the distributional characteristics 
by factors 0.996 (for locality targeting) and 0.970 (for household targeting). Including 
                                                 
14 In reality, of course, locality marginality was based on locality characteristics other than consumption, 
since the latter is not available in the census.    18 
costs, then, the proportion of the total gains from targeting accounted for by first-stage 
locality targeting increases to between 77-90 percent. 
We also carried out a similar analysis replacing locality targeting with 
municipality targeting and got very similar results. As expected, the percentage of the 
targeting gains accounted for by first-stage municipality targeting was lower, but still 
relatively high, at between 69-82 percent when targeting costs were ignored and between 
70-83 percent when they were incorporated into the analysis. 
Finally, it is important to point out that one of the shortcomings of geographical 
targeting is the fact that some poor households are left out of the program based solely on 
the fact that they live in the ￿wrong￿ locality. For example, under locality targeting, 
nearly 39 percent of poor households are left out of the program, essentially being 
replaced by nonpoor households. This outcome is clearly undesirable from the 
perspective of horizontal equity so that it is important that other components of a more 
comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy address this issue. 
 
5. THE RELATIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL POWER OF PROGRESA 
In this section, we evaluate the program conditional on geographic targeting using 
the 1997 baseline ENCASEH household census survey of 24,077 households in 506 
localities. For the purposes of evaluating the various dimensions of the program (i.e., 
education and health impacts), these localities were randomly allocated to ￿control￿ (186 
localities) and ￿treatment￿ (320 localities) groups. The analysis below is based on data   19 
for the 14,856 households in the ￿treatment￿ sample. Using data on household 
composition, we first estimate the benefits received by households based on the payment 
schedule set out in Table 1. For all households identified as ￿poor￿ by PROGRESA, 
payments are linked to the number, age, and gender of children. Therefore, one can view 
the program as involving a combination of household targeting and a demographic 
structure of subsidies. Table 2 presents average transfers by component separately for 
control and treatment localities. In treatment localities, the transfers account for, on 
average, nearly 29 percent of total household consumption. 
 
Table 2—Distribution of benefits across component for treatment and control 
beneficiary households 
  Treatment Sample  Control Sample 
Primary scholarships    76.1   75.9 
Secondary scholarships  130.0  132.6 
School materials    15.5    15.5 
Food transfer   90.0   90.0 
    
Total transfer  295.5  298.6 
    
Number of households    14,856    9,221 
Proportion poor: 
 Pre-densification  (PRO) 







Note:  Transfers are in 1997 prices based on Table 1. The total transfer reflects the benefit cap. 
 
The estimated benefits received by households are essentially hypothetical 
transfers, i.e., the transfers that would exist if there was 100 percent take-up by all 
eligible households. This hypothetical program acts as our reference for evaluation 
purposes and one would expect its benefits structure to closely resemble that of   20 
PROGRESA if the transfers were unconditional. We compare the welfare impact of such 
a program with the following alternatives: 
 
1.  Pre-Densification Transfers (PR): We compare the present post-densification 
pattern of transfers (PRD) with that which existed prior to the increase of the 
poverty line; 
2.  Targeted Uniform Transfers (TU): Instead of poor households receiving transfers 
linked to demographic characteristics, one can consider a uniform transfer to these 
households; 
3.  Non-Targeted Uniform Transfers (NU): Same as (2) but now all (i.e., poor and 
nonpoor) households receive a uniform transfer; 
4.  Non-Targeted Demographic Transfers (ND): A program without household 
targeting, where all households in the selected localities receive the benefits based 
on demographic structure. 
 
Comparisons across (1)-(4) help to identify the relative gains from household and 
demographic targeting. However, for the actual targeted demographic program (PRD), it 
is also useful to compare the existing structure of transfers with various alternatives. We 
therefore carry out the following comparisons: 
 
5.  Transfer Components: We decompose the welfare impact of each program 
component (i.e. primary scholarships, secondary scholarships, school materials,   21 
and food transfer) in order to identify the contribution of each to the total welfare 
impact. This analysis will inform the issue of the welfare impact of a change in 
the structure of the transfers (e.g., reducing food transfers or primary scholarship 
levels to finance an increase in secondary scholarships in order to get a greater 
education effect). 
6.  Actual Transfers: Some households do not receive the theoretical transfers 
because they decide not to take up certain benefits or do not satisfy certain 
conditions. Households that do not undertake their scheduled visits to the health 
center do not receive the food transfer. Neither do households in which children 
do not meet the 85 percent school attendance criterion receive transfers for these 
children. Actual will also deviate from hypothetical in so far as ages are not 
synonymous with school grades. 
 
Note that the reference program is the post-densification program. Where the total 
budgets of the programs differ from the actual post-densification budget, the benefits are 
effectively scaled up or down appropriately. 
 
COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-DENSIFICATION PROGRESA 
As indicated above, the classification of households as ￿poor￿ and ￿nonpoor￿ 
appears to have changed over time as a result of a ￿densification process.￿ In order to 
facilitate comparison to the earlier evaluation of PROGRESA￿s targeting (Skoufias, 
Davis, and Behrman 1999), for both stages of the process, we first compare the leakage   22 
(L) and undercoverage (U) rates, defined, respectively, as the percentage of poor 
households wrongly left out of the program (i.e., errors of exclusion) and the percentage 
of beneficiary households that are wrongly included (i.e., errors of inclusion). This 
requires that we establish an ￿ideal￿ welfare indicator and, in line with convention in 
economics (Ravallion 1993; Deaton and Zaidi 1999), we choose household per adult 
equivalent consumption.
15 The distribution of this variable (henceforth referred to simply 
as consumption) is presented in Figure 2 together with the pre- and post-densification 
poverty lines. 
Using consumption as the reference welfare measure, we classify households as 
poor and nonpoor and compare this with PROGRESA￿s classification, which was based 
on income. We find that pre-densification U and L were both 27 percent compared to 
post-densification, where both were around 16 percent. This difference, in part, just 
reflects the fact that a higher percentage of households were included post-densification 
thus leaving less room for U and L errors. For example, even using random selection of 
households, U and L would still decrease from 47 percent to 22 percent. But notice that 
using performance relative to random allocation, the pre-densification program performs 
                                                 
15  We use an updated version of the measure used in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999), which was 
provided by Emmanuel Skoufias to whom I are very grateful. The welfare indicator is, in fact, predicted 
consumption based on coefficients from a consumption model estimated using quantile regression analysis 
of data from the 1996 nationally representative household survey (ENIGH), which returned a pseudo-R
 2 of 
0.35. However, here we ignore the error inherent in this prediction, so that it is important that care be 
exercised in interpreting the magnitude of differences across comparison programs. But since we are often 
aggregating over large numbers of households, this can substantially reduce the associated standard errors 
(see Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw 2001 for details). Based on this consumption measure and the transfer 
schedule in Table 1, the program budget was 22.5 percent of the poverty gap and transfer levels were, on 
average, equal to 21.1 percent of total household consumption.   23 
better than the post-densification program: whereas the former reduces undercoverage by 
50 percent more than random allocation, the latter achieves only a 20 percent reduction. 
However, what matters more for the welfare impact of each program is where 
these errors occur in the distribution of consumption (e.g., are they concentrated around 
the poverty line or spread out). For example, the welfare losses from mis-targeting will be 
relatively high if a high proportion of the poorest households are wrongly excluded 
and/or if a high proportion of the richest households are wrongly included. We can 
examine this by looking at ￿predicted error probability￿ curve used in Skoufias and 
Coady (2001). We construct a binary variable where each household that is misclassified 
as poor or nonpoor by PROGRESA￿s methodology is assigned a value of unity with all 
other (correctly classified) households being assigned a value of zero. We then simply 
plot the averages for the various consumption 5-percentiles (Figure 3). Notice that 
although with pre-densification the curve is bell-shaped, with the percentage error 
decreasing the further one gets from the poverty line; with post-densification, this is not 
the case, with well over 50 percent of nonpoor households being wrongly included in the 
program. This is suggestive of substantial welfare losses due to mis-targeting.
16 
We finish this section by plotting the average percentage of households classified 
as poor in each locality ordered by marginality index and grouped into 5-percentiles 
                                                 
16 This comparison also highlights the fact that comparing leakage rates across programs of different sizes 
(as above) can be very misleading; they are relatively low post-densification because, although a relatively 
high proportion of the nonpoor are wrongly classified as poor, these are a much lower percentage of the 
total households receiving benefits, given that nearly 80 percent receive benefits. Similarly with 
undercoverage, the greater the proportion of total households included in the program, the lower the 
potential for undercoverage.   24 
(Figure 4). We do this for both the post- and pre-densification programs, but also for the 
post-densification program under the assumption of perfect targeting. Comparing the pre- 
and post-densification relationship between locality coverage and marginality, we see 
that the biggest increases in coverage occurred in the least marginal localities, i.e., those 
localities in the bottom quartile according to the marginality index. Since mean income is 
negatively correlated with marginality and given the observed high levels of leakage in 
the highest income groups, one expects that much of this increase is due to mis-targeting. 
Comparing PROGRESA￿s post-densification coverage levels with those based on 
consumption (i.e., perfect targeting), it is clear that the inclusion of nonpoor households 
in the least marginal localities came mainly at the expense of poor households in 
localities with marginality indices just above the least marginal localities, i.e., in the next 
to bottom quartile according to the marginality index. 
 
PROGRESA VERSUS ALTERNATIVES 
In this section, we compare the welfare impact of PROGRESA with that of the 
alternatives (1)-(4) identified earlier. The welfare impacts of all these programs are 
presented in Table 3 and their performance relative to PROGRESA post-densification 
plotted in Figure 5. Focusing on Figure 5, the first thing to notice is that the distributional 
efficiency is higher pre-densification compared to post-densification. At a relatively 
moderate aversion to inequality (e = 2), the welfare impact per unit expenditure is over 12 
percent higher pre-densification compared to post-densification. This, of course, is not 
surprising since, for the most part, the densification process is about incorporating    25 




















            
e = 0.5  1.42  1.48  1.44  1.38  1.30  1.25 
e = 1.0  2.11  2.26  2.13  1.98  1.77  1.65 
e = 2.0  5.05  5.66  5.04  4.56  3.74  3.32 
e = 3.0  13.27  15.25  13.09  11.71  8.99  7.76 
e = 4.0  37.23  43.41  36.33  32.41  23.76  20.16 
e = 5.0  109.32  128.66  105.92  94.38  67.05  56.34 
            
Average  transfer    113   122   125    110   113    110 
            
Number  beneficiaries   11,623    7,837   11,623    14,856   11,623    14,856 
            
Budget Scale Factor  -  0.73  1.11  1.25  1.00  1.00 
Note:   The budget scale factor is the factor is the ratio of the alternative program budgets to the post-
densification budget; its inverse is the amount by which the post-densification transfers need to be 
scaled down or up in order to keep the total budget constant. Note that the distributional 
characteristic is independent of the size of the budget and is interpreted as the welfare impact of a 
unit of income being transferred to households through the various programs; in other words, the 
distributional power of the alternative programs.  
 
households that were previously deemed to lie above the poverty line and, for well-
targeted programs, the distributional characteristic will always decrease as the program 
expands to include extra households. But in moving to the post-densification program, 
the budget also increases by 37.5 percent, which, using (4) above, implies an overall 
welfare increase of 25.5 percent. The question then becomes whether the decrease in the 
distributional power of the program could have been lower. For this one needs   26 
comparisons with other potential programs, a natural one being a program that targets 
perfectly using household consumption levels.
17 
What is somewhat surprising is that the post-densification program compares very 
favorably to the situation with perfect targeting. In fact, it dominates the latter for higher 
levels of inequality aversion. The intuition behind this at first counterintuitive result lies 
in the realization that while perfect targeting correctly identifies poor households, the 
transfer levels are not optimal across households; this would have included higher 
transfers to the poorer households. What is happening is that those wrongly incorporated 
under the densification process are moderately poor and have fewer children than the 
moderately poor households that they replace. Therefore, as well as having relatively low 
welfare weights, they also receive relatively low transfers, thus increasing the relative 
share of the total transfer budget received by poorer households, which have higher 
welfare weights. With consumption targeting, the households correctly included are 
moderately poor with more children and therefore receive relatively high transfers, thus 
decreasing the proportion of the budget going to the severely poor. Thus, the 
distributional efficiency of the program, which can be seen as a weighted average of the 
welfare weights of beneficiaries with the weights being the share of the overall budget 
they receive, decreases.  In the terminology of Coady and Skoufias (2001), although the 
                                                 
17 One can distinguish between ￿perfect￿ targeting and ￿optimal￿ targeting. Under the former, the poverty 
headcount is predetermined and perfect targeting involves identifying correctly those households that lie 
below this welfare level. In a sense, for a given structure of transfers, the transfer budget becomes 
endogenous. Under optimal targeting with a fixed budget, on the other hand, the cutoff point is determined 
endogenously as part of determining optimal transfers. Transfers are distributed so as to equalize the 
incomes of the poorest households until the budget is exhausted.   27 
￿targeting efficiency￿ (i.e., who you hit) of the densified program is lower than that of a 
perfectly targeted program, its ￿redistributive efficiency￿ is higher. Using the 
decomposition described in equation (6), we can see from Table 4 that for e = 1, although 
the targeting efficiency is higher for consumption targeting (λ T = 1.90 as against 1.77), 
the redistributive efficiency is relatively low (λ R = 0.23 as against 0.34). 
 
Table 4—Decomposition of distributional characteristics into its targeting and 
redistributive efficiencies 
 Post-Densification    Consumption    Pre-Densification 
  λ   λ T  λ R    λ   λ T  λ R    λ   λ T  λ R 
                    
e=0.5  1.43 1.30 0.13    1.44  1.36  0.08    1.48 1.38  0.10 
e=1.0  2.11 1.77 0.34    2.13  1.90  0.23    2.26 1.98  0.28 
e=2.0  5.05 3.74 1.31    5.04  4.07  0.97    5.66 4.45  1.21 
e=5.0 109.32 67.05 42.27    105.92  71.89  34.03    128.66 85.50  43.16 
Note:   λ  is the distributional characteristic, λ T is the targeting efficiency, and λ R the redistributive 
efficiency. The targeting efficiency pre-densification is higher than that for consumption because 
it uses a lower poverty line to select households. 
 
The results in Table 3 and Figure 5 also indicate that the (average) gains from 
targeting households within localities is in the range 3 - 14 percent, depending on one￿s 
aversion to inequality￿below we look at the distribution of this gain across localities 
with different characteristics. There are also very sizeable gains both from differentiating 
payments by demographic composition as opposed to uniform transfers ranging from 
9 - 39 percent when the program targets poor households and 12 ￿ 49 percent without 
household targeting. Both of these gains increase with the level of aversion to inequality. 
So, in conclusion, it is clear that in spite of the mis-targeting inherent in the densification   28 
phase of the program, the distributional power of the program is still relatively high. 
PROGRESA is an extremely effective program in terms of getting transfers into the 
hands of the most needy. However, it is also clear that in terms of relative contribution to 
the distributional power of the program, it is the demographic structure of transfers that is 
important, rather than the existence of household targeting. 
 
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFICIENCY OF INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
The structure of PROGRESA￿s transfers reflects its underlying objectives of 
improving the current welfare of poor households while simultaneously encouraging 
households to invest in their human capital. One of the issues being discussed by 
policymakers is whether or not the structure of benefits should be changed, in particular, 
whether a restructuring of scholarships so as to give higher grants to secondary school 
children and lower grants to primary school children is desirable. From an education 
point of view, this would appear desirable (Schultz 2001), since the biggest enrollment 
impact comes from this older age group, where enrollment is still relatively low 
compared to primary enrollment levels.
18 Here we are concerned with the trade-off in 
terms of current welfare inherent in such a restructuring of benefits. 
To address the above issue, we can interpret each of the separate components of 
the program as alternative transfer instruments. By calculating a distributional 
characteristic for each component using equation (5), we can identify the welfare impact 
                                                 
18 However, it is important to note that although enrollment rates are high in primary school, at around 95 
percent, the program seems to have important impacts in terms of improving progression rates and reducing 
drop-out rates (Behrman and Todd 2001).   29 
of reallocating a unit of the budget between components. A crucial feature of the 
program, however, is that total monthly payments to households are capped at 550 pesos 
per household. Therefore, transfers of the budget between program components may have 
very little effect on the net transfers to capped households compared to uncapped 
households. This would appear to be particularly important for the distributional impact 
of the program, given that from Figure 6, we can see that it is the poorest of the poor who 
are relatively constrained by the cap, with 70 percent of the poorest income group being 
capped. The difference between capped and uncapped transfers is also greatest for these 
households (Figure 7). We address this issue by analyzing the distributional impact of 
components with and without a transfer cap. We finish this section by analyzing the 
welfare impact of scaling down primary school transfers to finance a scaling up of 
secondary scholarships. 
Table 5 and Figures 8a and 8b present the relative welfare impacts of the various 
program components ignoring capping. It is clear that the more concerned we are about  
 
Table 5—Welfare impact of program components 
 Uncapped  Transfers    Capped  Transfers 
 









                
e =  0.5  1.45  1.52 1.50 1.51  1.30   1.43 1.45  1.38  1.24 
e =  1 2.17  2.36 2.32 2.34  1.77   2.12 2.16  1.96  1.61 
e =  2 5.34  6.01 5.96 5.98  3.74   5.12 5.05  4.31  3.05 
e =  3 14.29  16.45 16.44 16.40 8.99   13.51 12.71  10.44  6.61 
e =  4 40.66  47.16 47.76 47.28  23.76   37.96 33.95  27.26  15.92 
e = 5  120.64  140.29  143.77  141.38  67.05    111.62  95.27  75.53  41.61 
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those suffering from severe poverty, the more attractive are the educational components 
compared to the food (or health) component from a distributional perspective. This 
reflects the fact that the former payments are linked to the number of children in a 
household, whereas the latter is a uniform transfer across households, and the number of 
children in a household is positively correlated with household welfare. It is also clear 
that the capping of transfers reduces the redistributive power of transfers, consistent with 
the poorest households being more likely to be capped since they have more children. 
Also, in the absence of capping, primary and secondary transfers are equally 
redistributive. However, when transfers are capped, primary transfers have a greater 
distributional impact compared to secondary transfers. Also, the greater our concern for 
the poorest of the poor, the greater the relative distributional power of primary transfers: 
the welfare impact from increasing primary transfers compared to secondary transfers is 
nearly 17 percent at moderate levels of inequality aversion (e = 2), increasing to just over 
26 percent for higher levels (e.g., e = 5).
19 This suggests, therefore, that in the presence of 
capping, restructuring transfers in favor of secondary school children (in an attempt to 
increase the overall enrollment impact) may involve a trade-off in terms of a lower 
impact on current welfare for the poorest households. 
The above analysis is strictly only valid for very small (i.e., marginal) changes in 
the payments structure, since it assumes that those households that are capped do not 
                                                 
19 In the presence of capping, we assume that capped households do not receive any extra funds allocated 
to either the primary or secondary budgets, while other households receive amounts that keep their relative 
shares of the budget constant.   31 
become capped due the restructuring of the transfer system. For larger changes, this will 
presumably not hold, since households are capped to different degrees and a crude 
categorization of household into capped and uncapped may be misleading. We therefore 
conclude this section by evaluating the welfare impact of a specific restructuring of the 
transfer scheme: a 10 percent increase in secondary scholarships, with the budget held 
constant by an appropriate decrease in primary grants. We also replicate a modified 
version of this with the cap also being rescaled up by 10 percent. Our results indicate that 
although welfare decreases when we increase secondary grants at the expense of primary 
grants, these welfare losses are always less than 1 percent. This lower welfare loss 
indicates that the restructuring enables the poorest households to get a greater share of the 
budget than is suggested by the marginal analysis, consistent with some of the higher 
income households becoming capped under the restructured transfer system. When we 
also scale up the cap by 10 percent, welfare increases by a high of 1.9 percent when e = 5 
(Table 6). These results confirm that the welfare losses from restructuring scholarships  
 
Table 6—Distributional characteristic for restructured benefits 
Inequality Aversion  Cap = 550  Cap = 605 
e = 0.5  1.43  1.43 
e = 1.0  2.12  2.13 
e = 2.0  5.11  5.17 
e = 3.0  13.46  13.68 
e = 4.0  37.85  38.59 
e = 5.0  111.32  113.75 
Note:  The benefits are restructured by scaling up secondary scholarships by 10 percent and scaling 
down primary scholarships by a factor of 0.83, the latter keeping the budget constant. This is 
motivated by a desire to get a larger enrolment impact. The first set of results keeps the cap at 
550 pesos, while the second also scales this up by 10 percent.   32 
with the objective of enhancing the enrollment effect of the program are relatively small, 
but also that these could, if required, be offset by an increase in the maximum transfer 
allowed per household. 
 
THE GAINS FROM HOUSEHOLD TARGETING 
An important policy issue concerns the magnitude of the welfare gains from 
targeting poor households within localities. Our earlier discussion concentrated on the 
overall, or average, welfare gains from targeting; from Table 7 we can see that, on 
average, the welfare impact per unit expenditure increases by 2.9 percent for e = 0.5 to 
10.7 percent for e = 2 to 15.8 percent for e = 5. In general, one expects the gains from 
targeting to depend on 
 
•  The proportion of households that are to be included in the program: The greater 
the proportion of households to be included, the lower the gains from targeting. 
For example, the gains are obviously zero if all households are eventually 
classified as poor and included. This explains the fairly modest average gains 
from targeting indicated above, given the very high coverage rate of 78 percent. 
•  The targeting efficiency of the program: The better the targeting efficiency of the 
program, the greater the gains from targeting. In general, for well-targeted 
programs, there are always gains from targeting. However, if programs use 
inefficient targeting mechanisms, then the gains from targeting will be relatively   33 
small or even negative (e.g., if the poorest households were incorrectly left out of 
the program). 
 
Table 7—Average percentage gains from household targeting 
Inequality Aversion  Targeting  No Targeting  Targeting Gains 
e = 0.5  1.42  1.38  2.9% 
e = 2.0  5.05  4.56  10.7% 
e =  5.0  109.32 94.38 15.8% 
 
The above factors imply that although the average gains from targeting are 
modest, these gains may differ substantially across localities both because the percentage 
of household included in the program differs across localities and because there is 
evidence that the degree of mis-targeting also varies across localities. We therefore 
analyze the distribution of the gains from targeting for the current post-densification 
program, but also the potential distribution for the program if the current mis-targeting 
were eliminated. 
The distributions of the gains from targeting, relative to the mean gain, both for 
the current post-densification program and for this program corrected for mistargeting, 
are presented in Figures 9 and 10 for e = 2. Notice first that with the actual program, the 
introduction of targeting decreases the distributional efficiency of the program in some 
localities, i.e., the gain in moving to targeting is negative (for 17 localities)￿45 localities 
show zero gains. This is in part due to the fact that the actual targeting mechanism makes 
errors of inclusion and exclusion and dropping targeting may include some poor 
households previously excluded. As expected, these negatives do not exist for the   34 
perfectly targeted program. The maximum gains over both programs are 7.7 and 9.2, 
respectively (relative to a common mean), suggesting that the gains from targeting are 
relatively substantial in some localities and that these gains can be increased through 
improved targeting.  
Understanding the pattern of gains across localities can further help to identify 
when gains are likely to be substantial. We therefore examine the relationship between 
the magnitude of targeting gains and the marginality index. Figure 11 plots the 
relationship between absolute targeting gains and the marginality index. For the actual 
post-densification program, the gains first increase as one moves down the marginality 
index from the most marginal localities, but they suddenly begin to decrease again for 
localities in the top marginality quartile. This reflects the high degree of mis-targeting at 
this part of the marginality distribution. However, if this mis-targeting were to be 
reduced, one would find a consistently negative relationship between targeting gains and 
marginality. This helps to highlight the fact that efficient targeting becomes especially 
important as the program expands to less marginal rural and semi-urban localities if one 
is to capture the potential gains from targeting poor households. 
So far we have ignored the cost of targeting households within localities. In 
Coady, Perez, and Vera-Llamas (2000), we calculated that (incremental) household 
targeting costs were 2.7 percent of the transfer budget: these costs include the cost of 
collecting the ENCASEH survey as well as processing the data and applying discriminant 
analysis to select households. For every $100 allocated to the program, $2.7 is absorbed 
in targeting costs, with $97.3 available to be transferred to households. These costs   35 
therefore need to be offset against the improved distributional power of the program due 
to targeting. Applying equation (10), this is done by scaling up the denominator of the 
distributional characteristic (i.e., the program budget) by a factor of 1.027 or, 
equivalently, scaling down the distributional characteristic by a factor of 0.974. 
The distributional characteristic of the targeted program decreases from 5.05 
when program costs are excluded to 4.64 when these costs are included. That for the 
untargeted program decreases from 4.56 to 4.34. Therefore, the average percentage gains 
from targeting decrease from around 11 percent to around 7 percent. But, as with our 
earlier results, this modest gain hides variation across localities. Figure 12 compares the 
distribution of gains for the actual program across localities according to their marginality 
index, this time including program costs. The top line presents the distribution of gains 
when program costs are ignored; the bottom, the gains when program costs are included. 
The latter indicates that the gains from targeting are near zero both for the most marginal 
localities (reflecting very high coverage rates) and the least marginal localities (reflecting 
high mis-targeting). Figure 13 presents the corresponding pattern for a perfectly targeted 
program and helps to highlight that, even when targeting costs are included, the gains 
from targeting can be substantial on the margin but that this is dependent on cleaning up 
the mis-targeting that occurred during the densification process. But the gains from 
targeting are still negligible among those localities in the bottom 15 percent of the 
distribution of the marginality index.   
In terms of the present program, targeting costs are already sunk, so cannot be 
recovered, and are therefore irrelevant to the issue of whether to continue targeting or not.   36 
But if the recertification process requires incurring similar targeting costs to determine 
which households remain eligible, then, from a purely economic perspective, it appears 
that in these localities the returns to targeting are negligible. On the other hand, one could 
argue that because the net effect on the welfare impact of the program is negligible 
among these highly marginal localities and substantial in others, combined with the fact 
that the former tend to be relatively small in terms of number of households, it is not 
worthwhile deviating from the general principle of targeting. In this case, it is then 
probably desirable to apply a simpler targeting rule based on, for example, occupation 
(i.e., teacher, doctor, government official, etc.) or landholdings, at least in the most 
marginal localities. However, the analysis of Adato (2000) suggests that there may be 
important social costs associated with targeting and, if so, the nature and magnitude of 
these need to be considered. For example, if the related ￿social conflicts￿ are more 
important in localities where only a relatively small proportion of households are 
excluded, then it may be that the decision to target in the most marginal localities needs 
to be reconsidered. Whether or not to target in such localities is then more a socio-
political decision rather than an economic one. Since one of the common complaints from 
households has been that the lack of transparency in the selection of beneficiaries is 
unfair, it may be that the simpler rules are more acceptable and sufficiently precise in the 
most marginal localities. But there is no escaping the fact that the gains from targeting are 
relatively substantial on the margin and will presumably increase as the program expands 
into even less marginal localities. 
   37 
THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONING 
The above analysis is based on hypothetical transfers that involve an implicit 
assumption of 100 percent take-up, an assumption consistent with the program being 
unconditional. However, the conditioning of transfers (e.g., on households sending their 
children to school or on making regular scheduled visits to health clinics) means that 
households incur private costs, and this may result in some households not taking up the 
program or not taking up all of the benefits potentially available. We address two 
dimensions that can lead to the levels and distribution of transfers differing between the 
actual and hypothetical programs. 
 
•  Program Take-Up: Some eligible households may not take up the program at all. 
For example, those without children may decide that the relatively low transfer 
levels are not worthwhile, given the costs involved in take-up. 
•  Partial Take-Up: Households may only take up some of the transfers available. 
For example, given the relatively lower level of the food transfer, some 
households may think it is not worth taking up this component. Or some children 
eligible for transfers may nevertheless not attain sufficient attendance records or 
may not even enroll in school. 
 
We consider the effect of each of these on the distributional power of the program. 
In order to evaluate the impact of program take-up rates for the program, we need 
to adjust the sample of households to allow for operational problems experienced during   38 
the course of the program. In a number of localities, households that were supposed to be 
incorporated during the densification phase of the program were not. Therefore, we need 
to compare the distributional power of program with and without full take-up using a 
sample of households excluding those wrongly left out. This reduces the sample from 
11,761 to 9,598 poor treatment households.
20 To calculate the take-up rate, we use a 
snapshot of the program over the months of September-December 1999. Any household 
for whom a transfer was sent out and collected for this period is deemed to have taken up 
the program. Under this definition of take-up, we find an 87.6 percent take-up rate. This 
varies slightly across households incorporated before and after the densification phase, 
with the take-up rate for the former being 87.9 percent and 86.2 percent for the latter. 
Table 8 describes the distributional power of the program with and without the 
operation errors at the incorporation stage, as well as the impact of take-up. The 
distributional power of the program is substantially higher with the errors accounted for 
than without, and the difference between the two increases, the greater our concern for  
 
Table 8—Impact of take-up on distributional power of program 
  Operational Errors    Definition of Take-Up 
  Without With    Sent  Out  Collected  Actual 
            
e = 0.5  1.42    1.465      1.471    1.474    1.475 
e = 1.0  2.11    2.217      2.234    2.243    2.244 
e = 2.0  5.05    5.495      5.571    5.605    5.588 
e = 3.0  13.27    14.769      15.038    15.155    15.035 
e = 4.0  37.23    42.06      42.968    43.345    42.782 
e =  5.0  109.32   124.82     127.80   129.00   126.76 
                                                 
20 See the Appendix for more detailed discussion.   39 
the poorest of the poor. This is consistent with the fact that those not incorporated come 
from the densification stage, which incorporated the moderately poor. Leaving out some 
of the moderately poor results in a higher proportion of the actual transfer budget being 
concentrated in the hands of the poorest households. The final three columns present the 
distributional power of the program once we allow for some households not taking up the 
program (Figure 14). The appropriate comparison is with column two, i.e., assuming full 
take-up in the sample of households that were actually incorporated into the program 
(i.e., with operation errors accounted for). In all cases, adjusting for take-up increases the 
distributional power of the program. However, the fact that the magnitude of the 
differences between the distributional power of the program are low, e.g., never being 
more than 3.5 percent, reflects the very high take-up rates. Using transfers ￿sent-out￿ as 
the basis for determining take-up, the increase in the distributional power of the program 
is positively related to our concern for the poorest households, indicating that take-up is 
highest among this group. Adjusting further for collection of transfers, we see an even 
higher increase in the distributional power of the program, especially for high aversions 
to inequality, indicating further that collection is higher among the poorest households. 
But when we adjust even further by replacing hypothetical transfers with actual transfers, 
we find that, for high degrees of aversion to inequality, the increase in distributional 
power is lower. This suggests that although a relatively high proportion of the poorest 
households participate in the program, conditional on participation, they take up a lower 
proportion of their potential benefits (e.g., because not all eligible children attend school 
or mothers do not make all of their scheduled health visits). Since this also has important   40 




In this paper we have been concerned with evaluating the distributional power of 
PROGRESA, i.e., its ability to get transfers to the most needy households in the program 
localities, relative to other potential transfer schemes. The program delivers transfers 
based on household demographic composition (i.e., based on the number of children, 
their ages, and gender) targeted both at the most marginal localities and at poor 
households within these localities. Our results suggest the following. 
 
•  The gains from geographic targeting are substantially larger than those from 
household targeting. In fact, the gains from the demographic structure of transfers 
are also substantially larger than the gains from household targeting.  
•  In spite of substantial leakage during the densification phase of the program, the 
distributional power of the program is still very high relative to alternatives. This 
reflects its effectiveness at identifying poor households, but particularly its 
effectiveness at getting a relatively high proportion of total transfers to the poorest 
of the poor. The latter, in turn, operates through the demographic structure of 
education transfers.   41 
•  Restructuring education transfers towards higher grants for secondary schooling 
in order to try to enhance the educational impact of the program has little effect 
on the distributional power of the program. Any adverse effect it has can be 
reversed through simultaneously adjusting the cap on transfers, which is relatively 
more binding for the poorest of the poor. 
•  Although the average gains from household targeting are modest, these vary 
inversely with locality marginality. But to reap the gains from targeting as the 
program expands to include less marginal rural and urban localities, it is 
important that the targeting errors that occurred during the densification process 
be avoided. 
•  The impact of program take-up is to increase the distributional efficiency of the 
program, reflecting the relative higher take-up rates among the poorest 
households. In other words, relatively more moderately poor households select 
themselves out of the program. But these gains are small because of the very high 
take-up of the program. However, conditional on take-up, the poorest households 
take up a relatively lower percentage of the full transfers, e.g., due to lower 
enrollment rates. This aspect of the program is particularly important, given that it 
affects both the distributional power of the transfers and the human capital 
impacts for the poorest households. It therefore warrants further analysis. 
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APPENDIX: CALCULATING TAKE-UP OF THE PROGRAM 
To identify program take-up, we make use of a dataset that contains information 
on all the payments sent out to beneficiary households, which we merge with the baseline 
household dataset (i.e., ENCASEH 1997). We consider two different definitions of take-
up: 
 
•  households that have received some payments for any bimester up to and 
including November-December 1999; 
•  households that received a payment for any one of the final two bimesters of 
1999, i.e., for the months September-December. 
 
Given that for the first few months of the program households received payments 
that were conditional only on enrollment at schools and registration at health clinics, 
regardless of attendance, the first definition can be interpreted as identifying households 
that decided to take up the program at its inception. But some households will have 
dropped out of the program over time. Thus, the second definition treats the final two 
bimesters of 1999 as providing a snapshot of take-up some two years after the program 
was introduced in the treatment localities. Note that the first definition is subsumed 
within the second so that the latter is stricter and will therefore result in lower take-up 
rates. In our empirical analysis, for the most part, we focus on the second definition.   43 
The evaluation baseline dataset contains 24,407 households, which includes 
14,994 households in ￿treatment￿ localities. We find that around 60 percent of treatment 
households had some money sent out to them since the start of the program, implying that 
these households were deemed to have met the conditions required for receiving 
transfers.
21 Focusing on the 14,994 treatment households, we find that 78 percent (i.e., 
11,761 households) of these were classified as poor post-densification, 53 percent being 
incorporated pre-densification and the remaining 25 percent being incorporated during 
the densification process. Out of the 11,761 beneficiary households, 77 percent had at 
least one positive payment sent out to them since the start of the program. These 
constitute 95 percent of the pre-densification poor but only 40 percent of the poor 
households incorporated during the densification process. So, 2,681 poor households (i.e., 
23 percent of poor households) never had a transfer sent out to them. If we add in the 170 
households that did not have a transfer sent out to them for at least one of bimesters five 
or six in 1999, this increases to 2,851 households. To this we add 43 households that did 
not receive a transfer in bimester six and for which the data indicating whether or not 
they picked up their payment for bimester five are missing. These adjustments bring to 
2,894 (i.e., nearly 25 percent of poor households) the number of households classified as 
not having transfers sent out (576, i.e., nearly 20 percent, that were incorporated pre-
densification). 
                                                 
21 Conditional on registering in school and a health clinic, households can receive up to three bimester 
payments (i.e., 6 months) without further conditioning. Nonreceipt of any transfers thus suggests that a 
household decided up-front not to participate. Below we will discuss how this number needs to be adjusted 
for mistakes during the incorporation process. The corresponding figure for the control group was 78 
percent.   44 
So, in our data, it appears that whereas just over 7 percent of the poor households 
that were incorporated pre-densification did not receive transfers for the last two 
bimesters of 1999, the corresponding number increases dramatically to just over 60 
percent for households incorporated during the densification process. However, this 
number includes a group of households that were identified as poor during the 
densification process but are from localities that were never, in fact, incorporated. For our 
purposes, we view these households as not being part of the program and eliminate them 
from the analysis completely. To identify these households, we take all the households 
that were initially meant to have been introduced into the program during the 
densification process, that reside in localities where no such households ever received a 
transfer. This is consistent with the incorporation error being locality specific. In all, we 
identify 2,163 such households (i.e., nearly 42 percent of the households that were meant 
to be incorporated during the densification process). When these households are dropped 
from the sample, we are left with 9,598 households in the treatment sample, of which 731 
households never had a payment sent out since the start of the program nor did they 
receive a transfer in either bimester five or six. So nearly 8 percent of poor households 
that were incorporated can be deemed not to have taken up the program under our second 
measure of take-up.  
As well as those households that by choice or default have not taken up the 
program, there are households for whom transfers were sent out but were never collected. 
This provides us with a third definition of take-up, i.e., those households that both 
received and collected transfers for the months September-December 1999.   45 
In our empirical analysis we focus on the second and third definitions of take-up. 
The percentages of households not taking up the program under both definitions are 7.6 
percent and 12.4 percent, respectively. The corresponding numbers for pre- and post-
densified households are 7.3 percent and 12.1 percent, and 9.4 percent and 13.8 percent, 
respectively. So, even after adjusting for incorporation problems, take-up of the program 
appears to be substantially lower among those poor households incorporated during the 
densification process. 
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FIGURES   47 
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Note:  Here we compare a range of program alternatives to the post-densification PROGRESA program 
that targets demographic transfers, including: the pre-densification program (PR), a perfectly 
targeted post-densification program (Perfect), nontargeted demographic transfers (ND), targeted 
uniform transfers (TU) and nontargeted uniform transfers (NU). 
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Figure 7—Average level of capped and uncapped benefits, by consumption group 
per capita consumption
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Figure 10—Kernel density of gains from targeting across localities (consumption, 
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Figure 11—Welfare gains from household targeting across locality marginality 
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